Pace Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 4 Summer 2010
Showcasing Pace Law School Scholarship

Article 9

June 2010

Is a Mentally Ill Defendant Still Considered Competent to Waive
the Right to Counsel in New York After Indiana v. Edwards?
John H. Wilson
Criminal Court, Kings County, New York

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Disability Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy
Commons

Recommended Citation
John H. Wilson, Is a Mentally Ill Defendant Still Considered Competent to Waive the Right to
Counsel in New York After Indiana v. Edwards?, 30 Pace L. Rev. 1299 (2010)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/9
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Is a Mentally Ill Defendant
Still Considered Competent to
Waive the Right to Counsel in New
York After Indiana v. Edwards?
Hon. John H. Wilson*
I. Introduction
All defendants facing criminal charges, whether in federal or state
court, are guaranteed the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In Faretta v. California,1 the United
States Supreme Court found that under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, criminal defendants also have the right to waive counsel
and represent themselves. As noted by Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion in Faretta, a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of counsel “must
be honored out of „that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood
of the law.‟”2
“Respect for the individual” is the underlying, bedrock concept of
the law of self-representation. As noted in the recent U.S. Supreme
Court case of Indiana v. Edwards,3 the “constitutional right to proceed
without counsel when a criminal defendant voluntarily and intelligently
elects to do so”4 descends from “a nearly universal conviction, made
manifest in state law, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant
is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do
so.”5
But what if the defendant who wishes to represent herself is
mentally ill?
* John H. Wilson, a graduate of Fordham College and Pace University School of
Law, serves as a Judge in the Criminal Court, Kings County, New York.
He
acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of Court Attorney Alan Flexer in the
preparation of this article.
1. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
2. Id. at 834 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51
(1970)).
3. 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
4. Id. at 2380 (internal citations & quotations omitted).
5. Id. at 2383 (internal citations & quotations omitted).
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Let us answer this question by use of the following hypothetical.
You are a New York State trial judge. After examination by courtappointed psychiatrists pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section
730.30, the defendant before you has been found competent to stand
trial.6 She understands the charges, and can assist in her own defense.
Yet, defendant and counsel disagree. Defendant wants to show that her
actions are in defiance of a conspiracy, which reaches to the highest
levels within the Police Department, even to the office of the
Commissioner himself. Counsel wants to assert the defense of lack of
criminal responsibility due to mental disease or defect pursuant to Penal
Law section 40.15.7
Defendant petitions you to act pro se in a timely and unequivocal
manner. Though untrained in law, defendant is a college graduate,
highly intelligent, and capable of questioning witnesses without being
unduly disruptive. She is able to “carry out the basic tasks needed to
present [her] own defense without the help of counsel.”8 According to
the psychiatric reports, however, defendant is diagnosed as a paranoid
schizophrenic. Though competent to stand trial, she is seriously mentally
ill and wishes to present a defense that may guarantee her conviction.
How should you rule? Should you allow the defendant to represent
herself, despite her mental illness, or may you force a lawyer upon her,
and a defense, contrary to her wishes?
Under long-standing New York State law, the court must allow the
defendant to represent herself once she has been found competent to
stand trial so long as she makes a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of
her right to counsel.9 New York has traditionally held to one standard
for competency; if you are competent to stand trial, you are competent to
represent yourself.10
Yet, in Indiana v. Edwards, the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled
that under certain circumstances, a court has the discretion to deny a
defendant‟s right to represent herself, and impose upon her both counsel
and a defense she does not wish, for her own good.11
In light of this recent decision, can a New York State trial judge
now use his discretion to deny a mentally ill litigant the right to represent
herself, even after she has been found competent to stand trial?
6. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30 (McKinney 1995).
7. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 2009).
8. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2386.
9. People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327 (N.Y. 1974).
10. People v. Reason, 334 N.E.2d 572, 574 (N.Y. 1975).
11. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387-88.
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II. New York State Law—Competency to Stand Trial is
Competency to Waive Counsel
The Constitution of the State of New York states that “[i]n any trial
in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel . . . . ”12
In People v. McIntyre,13 the New York Court of Appeals noted that
“the right to self-representation embodies one of the most cherished
ideals of our culture; the right of an individual to determine his own
destiny.”14 However, the Court also noted that “we cannot disregard the
countervailing interest of society in the equally powerful ideal that our
criminal justice system must determine the truth or falsity of the charges
in a manner consistent with fundamental fairness.”15
In an effort to balance these two concepts, the Court of Appeals
stated a three-part rule as follows:
A defendant in a criminal case may invoke the right to
defend pro se provided:
(1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there
has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct
which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the
issues.16
Thus, New York law recognizes that the right to self representation
does have some reasonable limitation. Before allowing a defendant to
embark on self defense, a New York Court must conduct a “searching
inquiry” of the defendant‟s abilities.17 The court must inquire of the
defendant regarding her education, her previous experience in legal
matters, and whether or not she is aware that no concession will be made
to the self-represented defendant.18 There are instances where a
12. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
13. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322.
14. Id. at 325.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 327. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. See People v. Reason, 334 N.E.2d 572, 576 (N.Y. 1975).
18. See People v. Bedard, 696 N.Y.S.2d 745 (App. Div. 1999). The court is not
allowed to act as the defendant‟s lawyer. See Antoinette D. v. Christopher M., 387
N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 1976).
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defendant may be incapable to handle her own defense, due to limitations
on her education or her ability to conduct herself properly.19
New York law also recognizes that there are instances where a
defendant cannot meet these standards due to mental illness.20 By state
statute, a court, upon its own motion, can order a psychiatric examination
of the defendant to determine her ability to understand the charges and
assist in her own defense.21 A variety of factors is used to determine
whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial, including whether
she is oriented to time and space, understands the roles of the Judge,
prosecutor, and defense attorney, and has sufficient intelligence and
judgment to make decisions.22
Naturally, if the defendant is found incompetent, the court “must
adjudicate him an incapacitated person, and must issue a final order of
observation or an order of commitment.”23 But what happens if the
defendant is found competent and then decides she wants to waive the
assistance of counsel? After all, “it is settled law that a defendant may
be suffering from psychiatric problems, but is nevertheless not
necessarily also incapacitated under [A]rticle 730.”24
In People v. Reason,25 the New York Court of Appeals considered
this question, and explicitly rejected the notion “that there are two
separate and distinct levels of mental capacity—one to stand trial,
19. See People v. Krom, 458 N.Y.S.2d 693, 698-99 (App. Div. 1983), aff’d, 461
N.E.2d 276 (N.Y. 1984).
20. [A] defendant is presumed competent to proceed . . . unless the court
becomes aware of some basis for questioning the defendant‟s
capacity . . . . [N]either a prior history of mental imbalance, nor a
finding of mental incompetence . . . standing alone or combined will
suffice: there must be something that justifies raising the issue at the
time of the proceeding in question.
Peter Preiser, Esq., Commentary, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30 (1995) (citations
omitted).
21. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30 (McKinney 1995).
22. See People v. Valentino, 356 N.Y.S.2d 962, 967-68 (Nassau County Ct. 1974).
23. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.50(1) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2010). If the
defendant is not charged with a felony, the court “must dismiss the indictment . . . and
such dismissal constitutes a bar to any further prosecution of the charge . . . .” Id. If the
defendant is charged with a felony, then the court “must issue an order of commitment
committing the defendant . . . for care and treatment . . . for a period not to exceed one
year from the date of such order.” Id. The custodian of the defendant must apply to the
court for a further order of retention if “the defendant continues to be an incapacitated
person.” Id. § 730.50(2). Once the court “is satisfied that the defendant is no longer an
incapacitated person, the criminal action against him must proceed.” Id.
24. People v. Brown, 843 N.Y.S.2d 770, 777-78 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
25. 334 N.E.2d 572 (N.Y. 1975).
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another to waive the right to be represented by counsel and to act as
one‟s own attorney.”26 Finding that only one standard applied, the Court
held that after a defendant has been found competent, “[t]raditional
inquiry by the court demonstrating that the defendant „was cognizant of
the dangers of waiving counsel‟ and yet did so „competently and
intelligently‟ should suffice.”27
In fact, in language most relevant to our inquiry here, the Court of
Appeals issued the following warning: “[f]rom a practical viewpoint it
would be even more difficult to formulate a workable, and presumably
higher, standard of competency which would not infringe on the
defendant‟s constitutional right „to appear and defend in person.‟”28
New York law, then, provides for a two-step analysis. If there is a
question as to a defendant‟s mental competency, then N.Y. Criminal
Procedure Law section 730.30 is invoked, and a psychiatric examination
of the defendant is conducted.29 If the defendant is found competent,
then an analysis is made as to whether or not the defendant is capable of
defending herself in a “knowing and intelligent” fashion.30 This second
step is the same process used whether or not there was any question as to
a defendant‟s competency in the first place.31
Naturally, there has been criticism of this approach, and even
outright statements that the New York standard is wrong. 32 Nonetheless,
the “one standard” for competency has remained the law in New York
for more than thirty years.33
Perhaps the best known example of the “one standard” in action is
the trial of the Long Island Rail Road Shooter, Colin Ferguson.
26. Id. at 574 (citations omitted).
27. Id. (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 574 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6). It should be noted that the dissent
in Reason did not take issue with this aspect of the majority‟s holding. Instead, the
dissent believed that “[t]he trial court‟s warnings and questions fell far short of a
„searching inquiry.‟” Id. at 578 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
29. See supra notes 12-15 & accompanying text.
30. See Reason, 334 N.E.2d. at 575.
31. Id. at 574.
32. See, e.g., 40 AM. JUR. POF. 2D 171, § 21 (2009).
33. See People v. Anderson, 836 N.Y.S.2d 876 (App. Div. 2007) (trial court erred
when it denied defendant‟s request to represent self on basis defendant had insufficient
memory); People v. Soto, 806 N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div. 2005) (“Defendant‟s refusal to
pursue an insanity defense did not, by itself, render defendant incompetent); People v.
Forney, 757 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App. Div. 2003) (trial court improperly denied defendant‟s
request for self-representation without proper inquiry); People v. Wilkerson, 742
N.Y.S.2d 537 (App. Div. 2002) (once defendant found fit to proceed to trial, a further
psychiatric examination to determine if defendant is fit to represent himself is
unnecessary).
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On December 7, 1993, Colin Ferguson, a mentally ill individual,
opened fire with a hand gun on a commuter train traveling through New
York‟s Long Island. By the time he was wrestled to the floor by three
passengers, Ferguson had killed six people and wounded another
nineteen.34
From the beginning, Ferguson‟s attorneys wanted to pursue an
insanity defense.35 However, Ferguson was adamant that such a defense
not be used.36 After an extensive hearing as to his capacity to represent
himself, Ferguson was found competent to stand trial and allowed to
proceed to trial pro se and present his chosen defense to the jury.37
The resulting hearings and trial were a microcosm of the difficulties
attendant to allowing a paranoid schizophrenic to handle his own
defense.38
Mr. Ferguson asked to subpoena former U.S. President Clinton, and
former New York Governor Cuomo, to question them about statements
they made to the press about the case.39 His jury selection techniques
were described as “confused and disorganized.”40 In his opening
statement, Ferguson stated that the eyewitness accounts of the shooting
were “motivated by racism,” and that in fact, “his gun was stolen by the
34. Francis X. Clines, Death on the L.I.R.R.: The Rampage; Gunman in a Train
Aisle Passes Out Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/09/nyregion/death-on-the-lirr-the-rampage-gunman-ina-train-aisle-passes-out-death.html.
35. Jonathan Rabinovitz, Death on the L.I.R.R.: Lawyer Seeks Sanity Inquiry in L.I.
Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, § 1, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/11/nyregion/death-on-the-lirr-lawyer-seeks-sanityinquiry-in-li-killings.html. .
36. Peter Marks, Ferguson Collapses in Court after Scorning Insanity Plea, N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
20,
1994,
§
1,
at
28,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/20/nyregion/ferguson-collapses-in-court-after-scorning
-insanity-plea.html.
37. John T. McQuiston, Suspect in L.I.R.R. Killings Ruled Competent for Trial,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
10,
1994,
§
1,
at
28,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/10/nyregion/suspect-in-lirr-killings-ruled-competent-fo
r-trial.html.
38. For a comprehensive study of the Ferguson trial, see MARK C. BARDWELL &
BRUCE A. ARRIGO, CRIMINAL COMPETENCY ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF COLIN FERGUSON
(2002).
39. John T. McQuiston, Defendant in Rail Killings Wants to Question Clinton, N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
18,
1995,
at
B5,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/18/nyregion/defendant-in-rail-killings-wants-to-questio
n-clinton.html.
40. John T. McQuiston, Suspect Helps Pick 4 Jurors in Rail Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan.
20,
1995,
§
1,
at
29,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/20/nyregion/suspect-helps-pick-4-jurors-in-rail-deaths.
html.
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real murderer after he had fallen asleep on the train.”41
During trial, Ferguson often referred to himself in the third person.
At one point, he told the court that he would have asked that a witness,
one of his victims, be “punished for perjury,” except “that he‟s injured,
so my sympathy goes out to him.”42
Nonetheless, after Ferguson was found guilty and sentenced, his
appeal, on the basis that he was incompetent to stand trial and represent
himself, was denied.43 Citing Reason, the Second Department held that
“a defendant who is competent to stand trial is necessarily competent to
waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se.”44
There has been much criticism of the trial court‟s decision to allow
Ferguson to act as his own counsel. However, Congresswoman Carolyn
McCarthy, who lost her husband to Colin Ferguson‟s rage, should have
the last word on this issue—“the news media often referred to the
Ferguson trial as a circus. I feel I speak for most of the families who
survived when I say that in the end we felt the integrity of the court was
preserved throughout the trial . . . our justice system worked in the
Ferguson trial.”45
III. Historic Standards Under Federal Case Law—Competency to Stand
Trial is Competency to Waive Counsel
As noted in the Introduction, the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
41. John T. McQuiston, Suspect in L.I.R.R. Shootings Says Eyewitnesses Are Racist,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
27,
1995,
at
B1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/27/nyregion/suspect-in-lirr-shootings-says-eyewitnesse
s-are-racist.html.
42. Evelyn Nieves, Our Towns; An Anguished Audience in a Theater of the Absurd,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
31,
1995,
at
B5,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/31/nyregion/our-towns-an-anguished-audience-in-a-the
ater-of-the-absurd.html.
43. See People v. Ferguson, 670 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App. Div. 1998), appeal denied,
706 N.E.2d 750 (N.Y. 1998).
44. Id. at 328. In a very interesting article, Ronald L. Kuby and William M.
Kunstler discuss the Ferguson case. See So Crazy He Thinks He is Sane: The Colin
Ferguson Trial and the Competency Standard, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 19 (1995).
These attorneys, who had represented Ferguson before he decided to proceed with his
own defense, do not call for the abolition of the “one standard.” Id. at 21. In fact, their
opinion is that “any proposal to force counsel on an otherwise competent defendant . . .
would be ineffective, unwise, and unconstitutional.” Id. Instead, Kuby and Kunstler call
for an “overhaul[ ]” of “the present definition of competency.” Id. at 24.
45. Carolyn McCarthy, Op-Ed., Order in the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1998, at
A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/12/opinion/order-in-the-court.html.
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accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”46
In Dusky v. United States,47 the Supreme Court held that the
standard for competency to stand trial is “whether [the defendant] has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding,” and whether he has a “rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” 48
In Westbrook v. Arizona,49 the Supreme Court reversed a murder
conviction, holding that a defendant was entitled to two proceedings:
first, a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial, and then, a
separate hearing “or inquiry” to determine whether or not the defendant
was competent “to waive his constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel and proceed . . . to conduct his own defense.”50 This second
procedure was necessary to “determin[e] whether there is an intelligent
and competent waiver by the accused” of his right to counsel.51
A disagreement then arose between the circuit courts over their
varied interpretations of Westbrook. In particular, in Godinez v.
Moran,52 the Supreme Court explained that the “Ninth Circuit adheres to
the view that the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the
right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing
trial.”53
The Court held, in no uncertain terms, that there is no higher
standard, explaining that,
[w]hile the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a
profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum
total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to
make during the course of a trial . . . . This being so, we
can conceive of no basis for demanding a higher level of

46. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
47. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
48. Id.
49. 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
50. Id. at 150.
51. Id. Westbrook discusses two separate hearings, one for competency to stand
trial, and another to assess competency to waive counsel. This is no different than the
procedure utilized by New York State, which was discussed in the preceding section.
Initially, a defendant is examined for mental competency to stand trial pursuant to
Criminal Procedure Law section 730.30, and then, once found competent, she is
questioned extensively regarding her ability to represent herself. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 730.30 (McKinney 1995).
52. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
53. Id. at 396.
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competence for those defendants who choose to plead
guilty.54
Further, the Court stated, “[n]or do we think that a defendant who
waives his right to the assistance of counsel must be more competent
than a defendant who does not . . . .”55
Thus, like New York, as of 1993, the Court agreed that there was
only one standard for competence, and once a defendant was found
competent, that same standard applied to the defendant‟s ability to waive
counsel and proceed pro se.56
The Godinez decision did not have its intended effect because
disagreement over this issue was not quelled. A harbinger of the
continuing dispute is found in the dissent to Godinez—“[c]ompetency for
one purpose does not necessarily translate to competency for another
purpose.”57
In language which reveals the dissent‟s discomfort with the
simplicity of the majority view, Justice Blackmun states “[t]o try,
convict, and punish one so helpless to defend himself contravenes
fundamental principles of fairness and impugns the integrity of our
criminal justice system.”58
At no point does the dissent indicate exactly what standard should
apply. All that is called for is a vague “another standard—the one for
assessing a defendant‟s competence to waive counsel and represent
himself.”59
Nowhere is the unwillingness to accept the Godinez ruling made
more clear than in United States v. Kaczynski.60 Known as the
Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski was a highly intelligent, but mentally ill
individual.61 Like Colin Ferguson, Kaczynski did not want his attorneys
to present a defense of “impaired mental state” at trial.62 However,
unlike Ferguson, the trial court denied Kaczynski‟s motion to proceed
pro se, concluding that his request was untimely, and “not consistent

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 399.
See generally id. at 396-402.
Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 412 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 1113.
Id.
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with a good faith assertion of his right to represent himself.”63
Although the Ninth Circuit agreed that “the propriety of denying
Kaczynski‟s request necessarily follows from the district court‟s finding
that he asserted the right to represent himself as a tactic to delay trial
proceedings,”64 and denied Kaczynski‟s appeal, the dissent by Circuit
Judge Reinhardt is most revealing.
Initially, Judge Reinhardt finds unpersuasive the majority‟s stated
reason for the denial of Kaczynski‟s motion to proceed pro se, opining
that “[t]here is simply no basis for the district court‟s assertion that the
request was made in bad faith or for purpose of delay.”65 Kaczynski‟s
lawyers had made it clear that the Unabomber was not seeking any delay
in the proceedings, and that he was prepared to proceed pro se
immediately.66
Pulling down the edifice constructed by the majority, Judge
Reinhardt gives us valuable insight into the mind of the trial judge, in an
effort to reveal the true foundation for the District Court‟s denial of
Kaczynski‟s motion to proceed pro se.
Judge Burrell became more and more appalled at the
grotesque and one-sided spectacle over which he would
be forced to preside were Kaczynski to conduct his own
defense. He understandably developed a strong desire to
avoid the chaos, legal and otherwise, that would have
ensued had Kaczynski been allowed to present his
twisted theories to a jury . . . .67
One cannot help but think of the Colin Ferguson trial. “Not only
would such a trial have had a circus atmosphere,”68 Judge Reinhardt
states, but “[t]he government had been spared the awkwardness of pitting
three experienced prosecutors against an untrained, and mentally
unsound, defendant.”69 Thus, “„the judicial system breathed a collective
sigh of relief when the Unabomber pled guilty.‟”70
63. Id. at 1114.
64. Id. at 1116.
65. Id. at 1120 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1124 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1126 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1128.
70. Id. at 1127 (quoting Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century:
Representations of the Unabomber, 24 VT. L. REV. 417, 444 (2000)).
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The dissent goes on to note that “[t]he problem with this „happy‟
solution, of course, is that it violates the core principle of Faretta v.
California—that a defendant who objects to his counsel‟s strategic
choices has the option of going to trial alone.”71
The dissent asks “[w]hat should the response be when [a criminal
defendant] insists on serving as his own lawyer, not for the purpose of
pursuing a proper legal defense, but in order to ensure that no evidence
will be presented that exposes the nature and extent of his mental
problem?”72 In no uncertain terms, the dissent answers this question in
two words—let him.73 “[I]n denying Kaczynski‟s request to represent
himself, the district court unquestionably failed to follow [the rule of
Faretta].”74
Unlike Ferguson, Kaczynski was facing imposition of the death
penalty if he was convicted after trial, an option which would not be
exercised after his guilty plea. While the majority opinion ignores this
fact, the dissent asserts that this concern underlies the majority ruling. In
essence, “Judge Burrell[ ] . . . prevent[ed] Kaczynski from pursuing a
strategy that would almost certainly result in his execution . . . .”75
While this course of action may result in an unfair trial, nonetheless,
Circuit Judge Reinhardt‟s dissent states the rationale for the New York
“one standard” very clearly. “[T]he right of self-representation should in
some instances yield to the more fundamental constitutional guarantee of
a fair trial.”76 “However, in this instance, . . . there was no legitimate
basis for denying Kaczynski the right to be his own lawyer.”77
Thus, the Ninth Circuit‟s ruling in the Kaczynski case has paved the
way to the federal law as it stands today.
IV. Current Federal Standards—Competency to
Stand Trial is Not Always Competency to Waive Counsel
In Indiana v. Edwards,78 the United States Supreme Court made a
renewed effort to address the issues discussed in Godinez.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 1128 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1120, 1125.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1128.
Id.
128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
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Defendant Edwards was arrested after he tried to steal a pair of
shoes from a department store, and fired a gun at a store security guard,
wounding a bystander.79 He was found “competent to stand trial,”
though he suffered from a mental illness.80 When the defendant asked to
represent himself, however, the lower court denied the request, citing
Edwards‟s psychiatric history.81
The United States Supreme Court formed the question before it as
follows: “whether the [U.S.] Constitution required the trial court to allow
Edwards to represent himself at trial.”82 Beginning with a reference to
the Dusky standard, that is, “the Constitution does not permit trial of an
individual who lacks „mental competency,‟”83 the Court distinguished its
precedents on this issue, and ruled that a trial court has the discretion to
deny a mentally ill defendant the right to represent herself.84
While discussing Faretta, which had established “a „constitutional
right to proceed without counsel when‟ a criminal defendant „voluntarily
and intelligently elects to do so,‟”85 the Edwards court states that
“Faretta . . . did not consider the problem of mental competency.”86
Turning to Godinez, the Edwards court conceded that “Godinez
bears certain similarities with the present case[,]” however, “Godinez
does not answer the question before us now.”87 Creating what can only
be described as an artificial distinction, the majority stated, “[i]n
Godinez, the [lower court] sought to measure the defendant‟s ability to
proceed on his own to enter a guilty plea; here [the lower court] seeks to
measure the defendant‟s ability to conduct trial proceedings.”88
Citing the Dusky standard with approval, the Edwards court
specifically does not overrule Godinez, and continues to reject the
argument that competency for self-representation requires a higher
standard than that required to stand trial.89 Nonetheless, the Edwards
court distinguishes Godinez, and finds that “the Constitution permits a
State to limit that defendant‟s self-representation right by insisting upon
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
(1975)).
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 2382.
Id. at 2382-83.
Id. at 2383.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2388.
Id. at 2383 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807
Id. at 2384.
Id. at 2385.
Id.
Id. at 2384.
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representation by counsel at trial.”90
The mental gymnastics required to come to this conclusion are
impressive. While not quite rejecting the “one standard” of New York,
the Supreme Court simultaneously rejects the Ninth Circuit‟s “higher
standard.”91 Instead, the Court states “a defendant who would choose to
forgo counsel at trial presents a very different set of circumstances,
which in our view, calls for a different standard.”92 Noting that “the
problem before us cautions against the use of a single mental
competency standard,”93 at no time does the majority opinion define this
different standard.94 It is not higher. It is not the same. Yet, it is
somehow “different.”
How is the court to apply this “different” standard? Here, the
Supreme Court is very unclear. Throwing this matter to the discretion of
the trial court, the Supreme Court states that “the trial judge . . . will
often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions,
tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.”95
At one point, the court does reference a defendant‟s ability “to work
with counsel at trial, yet . . . be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed
to present his own defense without the help of counsel.”96 In the end, the
only guidance the Edwards court gives is to conclude “that the
Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular
defendant‟s mental capacities,” and to repeat that “the constitution
permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those
competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from
severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to
conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”97
Thus, the Edwards decision gives a trial judge, whether state or
federal, the discretion to deny a defendant‟s motion to proceed without
counsel, and to impose counsel on the defendant, as well as a defense not
of the defendant‟s choosing, without giving the trial court any guidance
or any quantifiable standards to apply in its decision-making.
The true rationale for the decision in Edwards can be found here:
“in our view, a right of self-representation at trial will not „affirm the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 2385.
Id.
Id. at 2386 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 2388.
Id. at 2387.
Id. at 2386.
Id. at 2387-88.
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dignity‟ of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his
defense without the assistance of counsel.” Further, “given [the]
defendant‟s uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result
from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove
humiliating as ennobling.”98
Thus, by allowing trial judges to force counsel upon a mentally
impaired defendant, the Edwards court declines to overrule Faretta, but
hopes to alleviate the perception that “Faretta, contrary to its intent, has
led to trials that are unfair.”99
V. Does Edwards Overrule New York State‟s “One Standard”?
So where does this leave our New York State trial judge with a
defendant before him who has been found competent to stand trial, and
who wishes to waive counsel and subpoena the file she knows the Police
Commissioner keeps on her daily activities? If the judge were to follow
the Edwards opinion, the court may cite the “different” standard
applicable to the defendant‟s right to self-representation, and force an
attorney upon the defendant, who would then assert the defense of
diminished mental capacity.
That would be the easy thing to do. It, however, would not be the
proper legal procedure to follow in New York State. Under Reason, the
court must apply the “one standard,” confirm that the defendant has
waived counsel “knowingly and intelligently,” and proceed to trial with
the pro se defendant.100
So how can Reason still be good law after Edwards, if the United
States Supreme Court gives state courts the discretion to “take realistic
account of the particular defendant‟s mental capabilities” and to force
counsel upon the defendant?101
To answer this question, we must remember that the bedrock, the
very basis for the right to self-representation discussed by the United
States Supreme Court in Faretta, and by the New York State Court of
Appeals in McIntyre, is respect for the individual. Since this is a right
found in both New York State‟s Constitution and New York State case
law, New York may continue to provide criminal defendants with greater
protection than the federal courts to insure that a criminal defendant

98. Id. at 2387.
99. Id. at 2388.
100. People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327 (N.Y. 1974).
101. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387-88.
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receives a fair trial.102
Further, as in our analysis of the Ninth Circuit opinion in Kacynski,
let us review Justice Scalia‟s dissent in Edwards, and pull back the
curtain to reveal the flaws in the majority view.
In Faretta, the Supreme Court ruled that “the Constitution
guaranteed to every criminal defendant the right to proceed to trial
without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elected to do
so.”103 This means “that a state simply may not force a lawyer upon a
criminal defendant who wishes to conduct his own defense.”104 In
Godinez, the same court determined that “it was never the rule at
common law that a defendant could be competent to stand trial and yet
incompetent to either exercise or give up some of the rights provided for
his defense.”105
Based upon these precedents, the Edwards dissent concludes that
“nothing permits a State, because of its view of what is fair, to deny a
constitutional protection.”106 Addressing the majority‟s concern for the
“spectacle” of a mentally ill defendant “humiliating himself” at trial, the
dissent frames the issue as follows:
[T]here is . . . little doubt that the loss of „dignity‟ the
right [of self-representation] is designed to prevent is not
the defendant‟s making a fool of himself by presenting
an amateurish or even incoherent defense. Rather, the
dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of being
master of one‟s fate rather than a ward of the State—the
dignity of individual choice.107
Thus, the dissent notes the overall effect of the majority opinion—
“[a]t a time when all society is trying to mainstream the mentally
impaired, the Court permits them to be deprived of a basic constitutional
right—for their own good.”108
102. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983) (“It is elementary that
States are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the
Federal Constitution requires.”). See also People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213 (N.Y. 2005);
People v. Stultz, 810 N.E.2d 883 (N.Y. 2004); People v. Ramos, 851 N.Y.S.2d 724 (App.
Div. 2008).
103. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
104. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2390.
105. Id. at 2391 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 2392.
107. Id. at 2393.
108. Id. at 2394. Recently, defense counsel for Aafia Siddiqui, currently on trial in
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Calling the majority opinion “extraordinarily vague,” the dissent
encapsulates the dilemma for the trial court. By following the majority
view in Edwards, “trial judges will have every incentive to make their
lives easier . . . by appointing knowledgeable and literate counsel” to
represent the defendant—as the court did in Kaczynski—in violation of a
defendant‟s right of self-representation.109
It is appropriate at this point to remember the warning of the New
York Court of Appeals in Reason—“[f]rom a practical viewpoint, it
would be even more difficult to formulate a workable, and presumably
higher, standard of competency which would not infringe on the
defendant‟s constitutional right „to appear and defend in person.‟”110
VI. Conclusion
The New York Court of Appeals decision in Reason, as well as
article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution, afford a mentally
ill defendant greater protection for her right to waive counsel than that
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Edwards decision.
Yes, in allowing the defendant to proceed to trial pro se, the trial
court may end up with another Ferguson trial—a defendant who makes
every effort to embarrass herself with her attempts at cross-examination.
There is no doubt that such a “spectacle” will be hard to watch, and even
harder to preside over. At the same time, however, judges will be
following the basic intent of the Constitutions of both New York State
and the United States of America—recognition of the defendant‟s rights
as an autonomous individual, capable of acting as master of her own fate,
and making her own decisions as to what defense to pursue.

the Southern District of New York for attempted murder, petitioned the Federal Court to
prevent their client from testifying at her trial. Citing Edwards, counsel for the defendant
argued that the defendant was mentally ill, and “that the right to testify should be
withheld where criminal defendants „will turn their trials into spectacles rather than
solemn proceedings.‟” Mark Hamblett, Defense Lawyers Try to Keep Client from Taking
Stand in Federal Trial, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 2010, at 1. This put the Federal prosecutor in
the unusual position of advocating for the defendant‟s right to testify at her own trial.
Mark Hamblett, Prosecutors Oppose Bid to Block Siddiqui from Stand, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 28,
2010, at 1. The trial court ruled that though Ms. Siddiqui had been disruptive during her
trial, she had not waived her right to testify, nor forfeited that fundamental right by her
conduct. Mark Hamblett, Siddiqui Takes Stand in Her Own Defense in Federal Trial,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 2010, at 1.
109. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2394.
110. People v. Reason, 334 N.E.2d 572, 616 (N.Y. 1975).
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